Firms have increasingly invested in green building certification to signal performance benefits and non-performance reputational benefits associated with green building. Using Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification data, we demonstrate that firms invest additional resources to attain a greater non-performance signal. Firms earn higher LEED scores to achieve a higher certification and provide a greener signal to stakeholders, indicating the presence of competition in green building. Over time, the market becomes more crowded and signaling becomes less pronounced, particularly at higher certification levels. Further, while buildings certified just above the highest thresholds cluster spatially, overall trends suggest decreased clustering of non-performance signaling in markets subject to crowding. Together, these findings provide a nuanced view of competitive pressures in green signaling.
Introduction
Firms engage in signaling to communicate characteristics to the competitive market. Green building certification is a costly signal that firms have increasingly used to communicate information about a firm's environmental performance or construction practices that aim to minimize environmental impacts. Much of the additional expense of building green comes from costs associated with the verification process under third party certifiers (Mills, Friedman et al. 2004 , D'Antonio 2007 , Morris and Matthiessen 2007 . Several studies have emphasized the benefits to "being green" from the perspective of improved building market performance and market signaling that goes beyond the productive improvements of a building . The signaling component of Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) benefits operates by reducing information asymmetry between owners and possible customers, making the owners' products more desirable, and may be a core component of a firm's "nonmarket" strategy Toffel 2008, Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010) in an increasingly competitive green marketplace. The performance component of green certification is akin to Spence (1973) 's signaling model where certification is a strategy that suppliers can use to reduce information asymmetries.
While some cases have demonstrated potential market advantages firms can receive from environmental technologies and strategies (Shrivastava 1995, Sharma and Vredenburg 1998) , the impact of competition on sustainability initiatives has been difficult to identify. LEED, a wellknown environmental certification scheme for buildings, is of particular interest due to its broad market uptake and interest it has received in the academic literature. Research that notes the physical clustering of LEED buildings (Corbett and Muthulingam 2007 , Cidell and Beata 2009 , Kok, McGraw et al. 2011 fails to control for spatial clustering of new building starts and development opportunities for commercial office space, and of overall building density patterns in a metropolitan area. 1 In this study, we seek to identify the impact of the multitier LEED certification signal in producing additional investment in LEED points by building owners. After identifying strategic thresholding behavior by firms, non-profits, and governments, and our analysis examines relative differences in signaling behavior across ownership type and building sector. By examining strategic behavior around LEED certification thresholds, an important distinction between this work and previous work in market signaling is that we focus on the non-performance component of the signal communicated through certification. Certification not only communicates information about the uncertain performance of a building, but it communicates characteristics about the building owner and occupier as well that are independent of the building performance characteristics.
Spatial and temporal trends around the certification thresholds help illustrate whether firms compete by adopting greener practices to signal sustainable market practices in response to competitive pressures. Alternatively, increased competition and a crowded market may decrease the value of green signals and lead to less strategic behavior around the certification thresholds.
Theory and literature review

Performance and non-performance signaling
The competitive advantages associated with LEED certification go beyond that of building energy efficiency and reducing the costs of production for a firm , Fuerst and McAllister 2011 ). An uncertified building could have identical qualities, but not credibly disclose its features. LEED seeks to address a classic information asymmetry problem by providing a snapshot of the building's qualities (Majumdar and Zhang 2009 , Fuerst and McAllister 2011 , Mason 2013 . It rates each building project's quality with a raw score that also determines its certification tier: Certified, Silver, Gold, or Platinum. Due to information asymmetry regarding building quality, in the absence of LEED, we expect underinvestment in green characteristics in buildings where builders, owners, and occupiers do not share information about individual building improvements and performance.
LEED certification signals some of this information in an accessible and verifiable manner ).
In addition to signaling a building's performance qualities, the LEED certification also signals other qualities not directly related to building performance for tenants or owners. These non-performance qualities include positive environmental externalities, management or owner qualities, and qualities of output. LEED can certify a building's positive external environmental impacts, which investors (Saha and Darnton 2005) , consumers (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001) , employees (Turban and Greening 1997) , or other stakeholders (Wood 1991) may value above and beyond the building's performance gains internalized to its owner or operator. Further, achieving LEED certification can effectively certify owner types, corporate social responsibility, and other difficult-to-observe management qualities that stakeholders (e.g., investors, employees) may value, above and beyond the building's performance. While not the same as certifying "green" products, LEED certification of a building may enhance the green image of its tenants and that image may spill over to its goods and services. That LEED certification offers a green signal about more than just the building itself can confer some market power or help the builder or owner command a premium ).
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Consequently, as more firms use this signal and enter the green building market, the advantages arising from this non-performance signal may decline (Chegut, Eichholtz et al. 2013, Sexton and Sexton 2014) . This is a crucial distinction from the performance aspect of the LEED signal, where certifying the internalized benefits from enhanced building performance does not dilute with greater market penetration.
Thus the signal produced by LEED has two components and conveys information about both building performance and other non-performance qualities (Shewmake and Viscusi 2014) . The LEED signal, measureable as the total number of LEED points and specific credits that each 2 Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley (2013, p95) find that LEED commercial office space rents for a higher rate compared with similar, matched class A office space, and that the rent premium is monotonically and non-linearly related to the total number of LEED points. They find no evidence for any price premium based on certification level independent from premium due to the LEED points. This finding lends credence to the idea that the market interprets the performance benefits to LEED based on the total and continuous point total.
building attains, conveys otherwise hidden information about quality (Shewmake and Viscusi 2014) . Its value depends on the reliability of the signal's form (i.e., the certifier, USGBC), the importance of the characteristics measured (i.e., the hidden information, such as energy efficiency), and higher costs of issuing false signals. A building's raw LEED score, constructed on a continuous scale from 26 to 69 for buildings that obtained certification under the LEEDNew Construction (NC) versions 2.0-2.2, can be construed as monotonically related to unobserved quality (Corbett and Muthulingam 2007) . As LEED's design intends, we assume higher scores imply higher performance qualities.
3 Further, we assume higher certification tiers imply stronger non-performance signals and more cachet to emphasize the firm's social and environmental responsibility. The relationship between LEED score and cachet or nonperformance signal, however, may be more weakly monotonic, with certification levels rather than raw scores playing a prominent role (Corbett and Muthulingam 2007) . Along the lines of Shewmake and Viscusi (2014) , Corbett and Muthulingam (2007) and , we assume that the performance quality is continuous in raw LEED scores whereas the non-performance quality is discontinuous around certification thresholds. The cachet segments markets across levels of certification, promoting owners to upgrade their building's certification levels to obtain stronger signaling benefits.
If LEED were merely binary (i.e., certified or not), it would signal both performance and nonperformance qualities, and some of the LEED certified buildings would have been just as green even without LEED. Making LEED a continuous score gives incentives to (some) buildings to be even greener, as they can recoup those additional costs through LEED's performance and non-performance signaling (Eichholtz, Kok et al. 2013, Shewmake and Viscusi 2014) . Putting 3 A separate analysis of LEED scorecards shows that the portion of improvements that fall into the "performance" categories (e.g. energy efficiency) increase at higher LEED scores.
in the arbitrary tiers, we argue, does not affect the performance signals -but it does affect (and arguably drives) the non-performance signal.
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Strategic signaling in a competitive market
This interpretation of LEED signals allows insight into the strategic behavior of firms related to green signaling. In monopolistic competition, firms aim to send stronger signals in order to drive up demand for their product. If firms compete through signaling, as suggested in a wide range of research (Fuerst and McAllister 2011 , Kok and Kahn 2012 , Chegut, Eichholtz et al. 2014 , the proportion of firms certifying at higher levels will increase with time. In Sexton and Sexton (2014) , the utility derived by an individual owner of an environmental technology is related to the uniqueness to the good and local environmental preferences. If firms build greener to take advantage of a higher non-performance signal, LEED may facilitate a greening of the building stock. This behavior may be conditioned by existing building stock and the behavior of competitors. If the non-performance signal confers some market power, an "arms race" or "race to the top" may occur as firms compete for market advantages by pursuing ever-higher 4 Let X measure a new building's performance in the absence of LEED. With information asymmetries present, X is suboptimal and a lower, "market for lemons" level of quality resultsalthough firms obviously still make some costly performance investments that they can recoup. A credible signal would allow at least some firms to build better buildings. Let Y≥X be the same building's performance with an untiered LEED program in place. Some of the incentive to upgrade building performance is in the "non-performance signal" is conveys. LEED's tiered system offers a convenient way to identify at least some of these non-performance signals.
Because the tiers' thresholds are arbitrarily set with respect to performance, the observed threshold discontinuities are a result of additional cachet or non-performance signal from achieving higher tiers. Let Z be building performance under the observed, tiered LEED system. As argue, the tiered system allows firms to upgrade further to capture this cachet, so Z≥Y≥X. With LEED's tiers, upgrading for non-performance signals does coincidentally yield (otherwise unprofitable) performance gains.
While we observe only Z, the discontinuities at the thresholds can us identify the buildings that upgraded from Y to Z to obtain non-performance signals. Of course, some non-performance signal may be continuously rising in Y. But at least at the (arbitrary) thresholds we assume the discontinuities result from cachet rather than performance. certification levels. Improving performance to gain non-performance benefits is an indicator of a classic race to the top (Auld, Bernstein et al. 2008) . 5 Upgrading-to-the-threshold and achieving ever higher tiers of LEED certification would be consistent with this story.
Alternatively, as more green buildings certify, the monopoly rents from non-performance signals are diluted with entry by new green-certified buildings (Auld, Bernstein et al. 2008 , Chegut, Eichholtz et al. 2014 . In a race to the start, market leaders capture the benefits of nonperformance signaling, while laggards enter the market to capture the value of the nonperformance signal accrued by the early movers (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010) . While firms will still certify green to take advantage of the performance signal due to the reduction of information asymmetry, with a diminished value of the non-performance signal due to a competitive market, there would be little incentive to upgrade at the thresholds, leaving a smooth distribution around the thresholds, consistent with a race to the start, as expected by others , Mason 2013 , Chegut, Eichholtz et al. 2014 ).
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Building patterns and spatial competition 5 Note that, for new building construction, the "racing" may not occur among incumbent players but rather among new entrants. Changes in certification and upgrading-to-a-threshold behaviors over time indicate changes in the "entry points" of new firms, rather than changes in existing LEED-certified buildings. (Other certification schemes exist for older buildings.) 6 Observing this is complicated by more market penetration of LEED not weakening the performance signals of LEED and because costs and benefits of the performance benefits of LEED may change over time. If the cachet loses its luster, non-performance signals suffer but not the performance signal aspect of LEED. Further, the increasing uptake of LEED in a market leads to its reduced utility. Increased upgrading behavior drives the premium for upgrading down, although other trends in the value of greener performance may rise or fall independently. Buildings' green performance can be expected to actually fall, but only back to the level justified by performance benefits. The cachet's incentive to upgrade fades, not the entire incentive of the certification scheme (i.e., it is a race to the start rather than a race to the bottom).
Real estate markets provide one way of viewing spatial competition in green signaling . If environmental preferences are spatially clustered (Sexton and Sexton 2014) , real estate markets may respond accordingly . To the extent that real estate markets are local and that real estate developers compete for tenants and retail establishments use green signaling to compete for consumers, spatially correlated upgrading behavior may provide evidence of spatial competition in green signaling. Further, because some types of businesses are more likely to compete spatially in a monopolistically competitive market (due to a smaller market radius), these patterns may be more pronounced in industries likely to be spatially competitive, such as commercial office. While some types of firms are engaging in nonperformance signaling to investors or other businesses, others are engaging in non-performance signaling to employees (commercial office) or consumers (hotels, restaurants, and retail). If firms compete to be green, we also ought to observe spatial clustering of green non-performance signals, as firms aim to send stronger non-performance signals than their neighboring competitors in a monopolistically competitive market (Capozza and Van Order 1978) . This pattern, expected in a race to the top, should not be observed in a race to the start.
It is important to note that this means of identifying competition may not capture non-spatial competition between firms for consumers or employees (e.g. developing a green brand reputation) or signaling to investors (e.g. greening a corporate headquarters). A spatial model of green competition only holds when the underlying preferences of consumers, tenants, or employees are spatially correlated.
Up to this point, the discussion of signaling via LEED has centered on for-profit firms, yet much of LEED-certified new construction has other ownership types (i.e., governments, nonprofits). While these organizations still pursue rents from green signals, they face different sorts of competition (e.g., competition for donors, pressure in political markets) that likely operate much differently than conventional market competition. They serve as interesting "control groups" to identify how market pressures affect green certification. It may be that forprofit firms are less sensitive to non-performance signals than other owners. If clustering of green signals is due to competition, we expect stronger clustering of spatial clustering for forprofit firms, rather than non-profit firms or government, due to the need for for-profit firms to compete for consumers or market share in a spatially dependent context. Conversely, if clustering is due to public building regulatory compliance or procurement processes, we expect greater spatial clustering of government owned buildings. While government and nonprofit firms may have even stronger motivations to provide a non-performance signal, we do not expect that these motivations are spatially dependent.
Identification of non-performance signaling
Following a similar methodology to Kleven and Waseem (2013) and Matisoff et al. (2013) , we establish a counterfactual distribution of LEED buildings in the absence of non-performance signaling due to the thresholds. Because performance benefits are similar on either side of the threshold, we interpret the excess number of buildings just above the certification threshold and the lack of buildings just below the certification threshold as the non-performance signaling component-an indicator of the signal value of the certification threshold. We identify the nonperformance signal by looking at these threshold effects. The performance signal exists but cannot be identified with these data.
Data
Data were obtained from the USGBC. The available data includes LEED point total, certification level, project name and address, LEED scoring system used, project type, buildings size, and site context. We restrict our analysis to the buildings within the LEED New Construction (LEED NC) versions 2.0-2.2 in order to maintain consistent methods and simplify results to comparable metrics. Because we expect building owners to behave differently in very rural areas, and for further reasons discussed in the next section, we have also excluded rural observations. Likewise, we only assess buildings in the contiguous United States (there are several LEED certified buildings in Hawaii, Alaska, and other U.S. territories which are too far to be considered in spatial competition with the buildings in the other adjoining 48 states). Under LEED NC, buildings must achieve at least 26 points to become Certified, at least 33 points for a Silver certification, 39 points for Gold certification, and 52 points or more (at most 69) to earn Platinum certification. These point thresholds represent 40, 50, 60 and 80 percent of the total number of "base" points (65).
7 According to a long time employee of USGBC, these thresholds were determined "arbitrarily, and not scientifically… when there were only a couple of employees of USGBC." The thresholds were meant to provide even spacing amongst the lower tiers, with platinum requiring a significant extra investment. Points for sustainable site planning, water safeguarding and efficiency, energy efficiency and renewable energy, resource and material conservation, and indoor environmental quality are awarded after a documentation and certification process, and all points are awarded independently. According to USGBC officials, for the lower tiers, there are many different ways of achieving Certified, Silver, or Gold 7 There are 65 base points, with 4 "extra credit" points awardable making a total of 69 points. The "arbitrary" thresholds highlight the idea that the thresholds are not natural cut points in building technology investment. A long time employee noted that there were only two employees at the time working on the project, and that these cut points were "not scientific in any way." As the scoring system was revised, minimums in certain categories were required to prevent firms from avoiding substantive investments in energy efficiency improvements.
certifications. For Platinum, firms must get most points available in some costly categories.
Notably, most buildings earn point totals that are either at or just above these certification thresholds. Building scores that are just below each threshold are rare. The frequency of LEED buildings at all certified scores is displayed in Figure 1 .
<<insert figure 1 about here>>
High frequencies of buildings at and just above the thresholds suggest several possible data generating processes. First, building owners may complete cost-effective credits, and then work for extra points to move up to the next level of certification. Second, firms set a certification target, building in a point cushion to ensure the goal certification is obtained. Some firms may fall short of their goal during the review and approval process and be unwilling to make costly adjustments to ratchet up, explaining why buildings periodically obtain a score just below a threshold value. Finally, some firms may seek to build 'the greenest building possible,'
irrespective of certification thresholds. Discussions with LEED builders and consultants confirm a mixture of these processes.
We divide our data into categories by owner type and building use. We examine three owner types: government, non-profit, and for-profit firms. Of the 3,437 total projects, 1,588 are owned by government agencies, 1,048 by for-profit entities, and non-profits own 801. Individual owners make up only a small portion of the total dataset, and are excluded from this study. On average, buildings score 37.3 LEED points, though non-profits score higher (38 points on average) compared to government and for-profit entities (averaging 37.5 and 36.6 points, respectively). In the LEED new construction sample, 19.6 percent are Certified, 33.3 percent are Silver certified, 41 percent are Gold certified, and six percent achieve Platinum certification.
Methodology
Summary of approach
We begin, following Kleven and Waseem (2013) by constructing a counterfactual distribution in absence of the multitier thresholds. This counterfactual allows us to compare the observed distribution to the counterfactual distribution by approximating the strength of the nonperformance signal for each building. After characterizing the quantity of non-performance signaling that exists across building types, we observe how the strength of this signaling changes with time. As described above, we expect non-performance signaling to 'wash away' in purely competitive markets, and to persist or strengthen under monopolistic competition. Nonperformance signaling can be understood to increase when the excess portion of certified buildings achieving scores at or just above the threshold increases. We test for these trends across owner types. Finally, we assess evidence of clustering of these signals across ownership types and building uses.
Measuring non-performance signaling propensities
First, this study identifies the proportions of upgrading within the LEED certification due to benefits from the non-performance signal. To determine the propensity for non-performance signaling at each point value within the LEED certification program, a counterfactual distribution of LEED buildings describes a hypothetical distribution of buildings were no certification thresholds exist and building attributes are described by the LEED certification point total.
While other factors (e.g. energy prices, contractor learning and behavior, locally appropriate building attributes) may impact the types of investments or improvements made by building owners, a key assumption in this analysis is that the performance benefits are locally smooth around certification thresholds. Because some of the points are accrued for positive externalities of a firm that provide no operational benefits (e.g. reducing construction waste), firms could forgo just one or two of these LEED points and have the same level of performance benefits, with a lower level of non-performance signaling. We test for spatial clustering in nonperformance signaling, independent of spatial clustering in performance signaling.
Following Kleven and Waseem (2013) a locally smooth polynomial function is generated based on the distribution of buildings with LEED scores not immediately impacted by the thresholds. The buildings just above ("bunchers") and below ("dominated") each threshold are dropped to approximate a distribution unaffected by strategic behavior around the thresholds.
The smooth polynomial function is drawn based on the remaining data. This eliminates the pronounced discontinuities visible in the observed distribution (Fig. 1) , creating a feasible empirically determined counterfactual distribution. This counterfactual illustrates the LEED building distribution in the absence of discontinuous signaling due to the certification thresholds.
If LEED buildings reflect only production-related benefits to LEED attainment rather than discontinuities at the threshold, the observed distribution would be smooth (Corbett and Muthulingam 2007) , peaking in density at the average cost-effective LEED score due to the performance benefits and related performance signaling alone (Corbett and Muthulingam 2007) .
The range of LEED scores around each threshold dropped from the distribution may impact the resulting counterfactual. A tradeoff exists between information retention and reducing the impact of the signaling thresholds. To keep more information in the distribution to generate the kernel density, dropping fewer LEED scores is ideal. However this may cause some buildings that are influenced by signaling effects to remain in the counterfactual distribution, skewing results. To avoid either extreme, in which the counterfactual density would be either over-or underestimated, we drop four scores around each threshold: the point value of the threshold, the one above it, and the two below it. This creates a smooth counterfactual of LEED building patterns. 8 Following similar conservative logic, we estimate the polynomial counterfactual using a smoothing bandwidth of two LEED points.
The observed and counterfactual distributions are graphed in Figure 2 . The counterfactual distribution is compared to the observed distributions to assign a non-performance signal value for each building project based on the number of points achieved in the LEED scoring system.
This value represents the portion of the observed frequency that exceeds the counterfactual expectation divided by the individual observations composing the observed frequencies. To avoid double-counting, and because we are interested only in the excess of buildings above thresholds, the signaling value is censored to preserve only positive values.
<<<insert figure 2 about here>>>
The signaling value at each LEED score i can be defined as:
(observed frequency i -counterfactual frequency i ) / observed frequency i (1)
Thus, a building scoring at or just above a certification threshold, where the observed frequency is much higher than expected by the counterfactual, will have a very high signaling value. If the frequencies observed in the data and predicted by the counterfactual are similar at a 8 Corbett et al. (2007) contend that a performance-based distribution must be unimodal and imposed various distributions on the empirical distribution of LEED buildings to determine the most appropriate explanation for the empirical multi-modal LEED distribution. We remain atheoretical about the shape of the expected distribution, and simply estimate a smooth distribution based on the empirical distribution, excluding the observations around the thresholds.
given building's score, that building will have a signaling value close to zero. For signaling values below zero, x i is censored. While other methods to construct a counterfactual are possible, across all potential counterfactuals, the high points in the observed distribution will correspond to high signaling values, and the low points to low signaling values. Results remain consistent across a wide range of potential counterfactual functions.
Temporal trends in non-performance signaling
After identifying the intensity of the signaling effect for each LEED building score, we calculate average non-performance signaling by building and owner type, observe changes in the prevalence of non-performance signaling over time, and whether the relative importance of signaling tiers increases or decreases over time. We observe the changes in the portions of LEED buildings certifying annually in each of the four tiers and the excess portions of new LEED buildings bunching just above the certification thresholds for each year by owner type and certification level, to determine whether the sharp discontinuities in the observed distribution are increasing or decreasing over time, and whether trends are consistent for each level of certification. This is done by calculating x i for each year T, based on only on observations in year t ≤ T and summing the number of signaling buildings (x i n i , for observed frequency as score i = n i ) across all scores in a particular certification level, then dividing by the total number of observations those same years. Thus, the values reported in Table 2 follow from:
as summed over all scores i in certification level c and calculated using only observations in year t ≤ T, the count of which is N i . We also compute this for subsamples of owner types (i.e., government, for-profit, non-profit), in which case the counterfactual for x i is computed based on observations for that year or prior. For Table 1 , this share of signaling is calculated using all years (T=2013).
Calculating spatial clustering of non-performance signaling
The second stage of the study identifies the spatial dependence of signaling effects by calculating the global Moran's Index (Moran's I), which reflects the level of spatial autocorrelation (Moran, 1950) for each sample. Moran's I ranges from negative to positive one.
A value of negative one indicates perfect dispersion of the sample; a positive one illustrates perfectly clustered observations, and a zero indicates random spatial distribution. Moran's I is defined as:
where N is the number of observations which are indexed by i and j, and X is the variable of interest (in this case, either the identity of the building or the signaling factor of the building's score). The spatial weights matrix, w, is constructed to define which neighboring observations may influence one another. This can be constructed in several ways including distance within a given radius, number of nearest observations, or inverse distance. Distance or nearest-neighbor threshold comparisons are highly sensitive to the selected threshold values, which may not be representative of each building's competitive market. We utilize the inverse-distance weight construction to compare LEED building decisions across variable market sizes, which assumes that observations are more dependent on other nearby observations compared to those that are far away. To eliminate buildings that may skew the results because they do not have any neighbors within a reasonable distance, we remove the very rural observations from this data set. 
Results
Non-performance signaling in LEED buildings
Signaling values are assigned to each building based on the counterfactual distribution obtained from the locally smooth polynomial. Results demonstrate that many LEED buildings bunch at and above each certification threshold (seen in Fig. 1 ), producing strong positive nonperformance signaling at these LEED point values. Few buildings attain just below the threshold, producing signaling values equal to zero at those LEED scores, as seen in Figure 2 .
Figure 2 also displays the signaling value (x i ) assigned to each LEED score. The locally smoothed density for the counterfactual, depicted in Figure 2 , is a rather conservative approach.
Note how, even with its estimation based on data that omits all observations at or just above thresholds, it still shows local peaks at each threshold. This is a result from selecting a relatively narrow window around each threshold; widening that window would smooth out the counterfactual distribution even further than quickly result in a more unimodal distribution.
Alternative counterfactual distributions, such as χ 2 or normal, tend to be even less data-driven and even less conservative. The current approach shown in Figure 2 yields conservative signaling values that likely substantially understate the extent of signaling in practice. Gold buildings in the data. Hotels and restaurants exhibit above-average signaling shares (16% and 14%, respectively). This is driven by a preponderance of signaling behavior at the Silver tier for hotels and at the Gold tier for restaurants. Community development, interpretive centers, laboratories, and stadiums also have above-average signaling shares.
Variation by building owner and use
<<insert Table 1 Figure 4 shows that the spikes and sharp drop-offs in density as points pass thresholds are becoming more muted over time. This suggests a shift in nonperformance signaling over time as well as shifts to higher levels of certification overall. Table 2 displays changes in signaling shares over time. For the full sample, the signaling share is erratically falling over time, from 14.2% at the start to 11.7% when the most current observations are included. This trend is reflected within the Silver and Gold certification levels as well. Table 2 also shows these trends for subsamples based on owner types, and the results are largely consistent regardless of owner types. There are generally declining shares of nonperformance signalers in these subsamples from 2002 to 2010.
<<<insert Table 2 Kleven and Waseem (2013) , the "bunchers" are spatially correlated (I = .12). It is important to recall that the spatial correlation we observe is for non-performance signaling and thus controls for any performance reasons to bump up as well as for the physical clustering of LEED buildings due to patterns in new construction. In other words, the positive spatial correlation reported in Table 3 is above and beyond colocation driven by spatial clustering of buildings generally or spatially correlated performance costs and benefits. It is, given where all the LEED certified buildings locate, a measure of how spatially clustered their non-performance signaling intensities (x i ) are.
The statistically significant spatial autocorrelation index for the full sample is driven by several subsets of buildings. In particular, government buildings and buildings constructed just above the Silver and Gold and Platinum thresholds demonstrate significant spatial clustering. Note too, that even fairly small samples achieve statistical significance (as in retail buildings), and that some larger samples do not (as in commercial office buildings). This confirms that the clustering finding is not simply the result of a large sample size driving down standard errors.
<< Insert Table 3 about here >>
The strong statistical significance for the clustering of government buildings suggests that clustering may be driven by public building procurement and policies, rather than by competition. The strong result of clustering in the highest tiers, however, also suggests that green competition may be playing a large role in the higher tiers.
Discussion
LEED encourages higher non-performance signaling
Our analysis reveals a nuanced relationship between certification, green building, and nonperformance signaling trends. Several pieces of evidence demonstrate that the multitier labeling context of LEED encourages building owners to build "greener" to send a stronger nonperformance market signal by ratcheting up at the tiers to capture additional cachet associated with a firm or organization's positive externality. Across all subsamples, buildings bunch just above the certification thresholds, demonstrating that building owners have invested additional resources to achieve a higher level of certification. However, over time, we observe that firms and other organizations are less likely to construct buildings that achieve a point total just above higher levels of certification. This trend suggests that a crowding market has led to the nonperformance signal associated with LEED to fade over time, even though overall market trends have pushed towards higher levels of certification.
The multitier and continuously scored label, in contrast to a binary certification, allows firms to continuously differentiate themselves in the market. Because USGBC revises standards every few years, the tightening standards force firms to repeatedly become "greener" in order to send a non-performance signal. Notably, several shifts occurred in green building patterns in conjunction with the introduction of the v2009 certification scheme. First, 2009 and represented a local peak for non-performance signaling with a larger share of buildings achieving
Gold certification in those years, just as the new standards were introduced. This suggests that firms rushed to gain Gold certification before the standards were changed. Second, 2009
represents the peak of Gold certification. While market trends had shifted from Certified and Silver and towards Gold, this trend stopped with the introduction of the new v2009 standards.
These results suggest that the new standards represented an opportunity to send a stronger nonperformance signal in a newer less crowded market, but also a last opportunity to get projects in under the old standards.
Non-performance signaling is spatially clustered
Supporting previous research (Cidell 2009, Kahn and , we find evidence of spatial clustering of non-performance signaling in green building behavior, once building patterns are accounted for, suggesting that spatial competition may be a driver of ratcheting up behavior at the highest tiers. However, these results are nuanced, based on varying findings across the thresholds and within specific building sectors. Buildings at the Silver or Gold certification standards are especially more likely to be built just above the threshold if nearby LEED buildings have also been built just above the threshold. This is consistent with firms that upgrade for non-performance signaling benefits to do so when nearby buildings do likewise.
This suggests a role for spatial competition in signaling akin to an arms race over green signaling. That government buildings demonstrate the strongest effects of spatial autocorrelation confirms the role of procurement policies in driving green building (Simcoe and Toffel 2011) .
Unfortunately, due to spatial dispersion of new LEED construction at large, it is likely that the data are simply not dense enough to consistently identify these sorts of patterns within many of the particular building uses.
A case for competition in non-performance signaling?
Taken together, our findings suggest that the multitier context, combined with increasing demand for green building, allows firms to engage in competition to send a stronger nonperformance signal. As opposed to a wide range of other voluntary programs where firms receive the same marketing benefit for participation regardless of participation intensity, LEED uses a tiered grading system that adds transparency and allows firms to differentiate performance based on LEED labels. The success of LEED may hinge on allowing firms to distinguish themselves by sending a strong green signal by certifying at the highest tiers, while still allowing for other firms and organizations to send a weaker green signal by complying with the lower tiers and certify performance. This dynamic invites further investigation.
Discussions with LEED officials, real estate management companies, and other professionals in the industry suggest several behavioral and economic trends that help elucidate these results.
Real estate investment professionals note continued pressure to certify green by real estate investment trusts and to attempt to differentiate a building by achieving higher levels of certification. Other stakeholders, such as university campus architects, note competitive pressure due to the behavior of other universities, sustainability rankings, and the desire to market a "green" campus. These observations are consistent with the overall findings of signaling, paired with a lack of significance in the for-profit sector of the spatial analysis, suggesting that firms may be signaling primarily to investors or other stakeholders that are not spatially clustered. The non-performance portion of the LEED signal likely targets investors, donors, and other stakeholders more than it does to employees, tenants, or customers (who may be targeted by the performance portion of the signal).
As green building practices have become standard, certifying basic levels of building performance may have reduced value, and firms seeking to differentiate themselves have pursued higher levels of certification. Nevertheless, some building owners have continued to pursue LEED at the lower levels, presumably to pursue a performance signal.
Second, real estate investment professionals point to dynamic competition in the real estate market based on a combination of types of actors and increasing demand for "green" real estate.
They point to pioneers that sought to build and certify green for ideological reasons or to be able to market themselves as leaders in environmental sustainability. As the market shifted, and LEED certification has become increasingly common, higher levels of certification were required to be pioneers. 9 This suggests that the additional marketing benefits of going above Certified or Silver become more valuable after competition crowds out the marketable benefit of the lowest levels, consistent with results from Kok et al. (2011) . Buildings must become greener if they want to get the same benefits as their early-adopting counterparts. The non-increasing signaling share over time (see Table 2 ) contrasts with this common perception expressed in discussions with stakeholder. The inconsistency could result from "pioneers" being sufficiently rare that they do not drive the estimates here. The signaling factor at the higher levels of certification might not rise over time if the marginal point cost falls fast enough or builders' aversion to the risk of inadvertently falling just below a threshold grows strong enough. Either of those trends could lead to pioneers increasingly "overshooting" thresholds when their upgrade for non-performance signaling benefits.
Others, in contrast, are responding to investor preferences -and in particular pressures from Finally, professionals in the field note a third type of participant -those who "are just keeping up with the Joneses." According to discussions with real estate managers, this class of participants simply certifies green because the market has moved in this direction.
Several market trends may also help explain some of this behavior. As market penetration of green building increases, the costs of green building are likely to drop and it may be easier to achieve higher levels of certification. Decreasing costs may explain the overall shift to higher certification levels in the market. While overall demand and decreased costs for green building may have shifted the market towards higher tiers of certification, it is apparent that an increasingly competitive market has diminished the ability of a building to secure rents from certification. That spatial clustering of non-performance signaling suggests a mechanism where colocating buildings apply competitive pressures in seeking and diluting the non-performance signaling rents.
According to discussions with engineers, LEED has reduced costs to higher levels of certification by driving the market, changing norms, and making it easier to pursue certain credits. Early in the LEED program, it was difficult to achieve credits related to the procurement and handling of waste because recycled content and recycling construction waste were not readily available in the market. As market penetration increased note an increase from less than two to near 30 percent of the commercial office market), the availability of these options has greatly increased. Many of these options are now considered standard best practices. Many of these basic practices have been adopted as local building codes. For example, Washington D.C. now requires new buildings over 50,000 square feet to be built at the LEED Silver level, though does not require certification, and the ASHRAE 90.1-2013 building codes require basic LEED practices.
These findings highlight the role of the USGBC and conditions present in the real estate market that at times foster a race to the top, and at times foster a race to the start. Increasing demand for green real estate, due to pressures from investors, employees, and consumers has sustained demand for the non-performance signal associated with green building. If demand were to drop as the market would become crowded due to new entrants, the value of the nonperformance signal would disappear. While the value of the performance signal would remain, the distribution of LEED building points would increasingly reflect the value of the performance signal, which would be continuous rather than discontinuous at the thresholds.
Conclusion
The multitier labeling structure of LEED encourages firms to invest more to become "greener" in order to obtain a non-performance signal associated with a higher LEED certification level. Over time, a greater portion of buildings have been built at higher tiers, while a smaller portion have been built just above the certification thresholds. While the market has shifted to be "greener,"
the non-performance portion of the certification signal has diminished. Spatial correlation of the signaling behavior exists at the higher levels of certification, but not at the lowest level of certification. While the competitive pressures for green building exist across all owner types, these trends are most pronounced in the government building sector, suggesting a strong role for politics and policy in driving green building patterns. 
